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This experiment examined children's and undergraduates' verbal and nonverbal deceptive 
behavior, and the extent to which their truths and lies could be correctly classified by paying 
attention to these responses. A total of 196 participants (aged 5-6, 10-11, 14-15, and 
undergraduates) participated in an erasing the blackboard event, and told the truth or lied 
about the event afterwards. Nonverbal and verbal responses were coded, the latter with 
Criteria-Based Content Analysis and Reality Monitoring. Although children and 
undergraduates demonstrated different behaviors (for example, the children obtained lower 
CBCA scores and made more movements), actual cues to deceit were remarkably similar 
across different age groups (for example, both 5-6-year-olds and undergraduates obtained 
lower CBCA scores and made fewer movements while lying). A combination of verbal and 
nonverbal lie detection methods resulted in more correct classifications of liars and truth 
tellers than the verbal and nonverbal lie detection methods individually, with the combined 
method obtaining hit rates as high as 88%. 
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 Detecting Deceit Via Analyses of Verbal and Nonverbal Behavior 
 in Children and Adults 
 Although it sounds reasonable to suggest that looking at a combination of nonverbal 
and verbal behaviors ("speech content") will lead to more accurate classifications of liars and 
truth tellers than investigating nonverbal and verbal behaviors separately, researchers rarely 
investigate both types simultaneously. Vrij, Edward, Roberts, and Bull (2000) examined 
(adult) participants' nonverbal and verbal behavior (the latter investigated with Criteria-Based 
Content Analysis and Reality Monitoring) and obtained the most accurate classifications of 
liars and truth tellers when both the nonverbal and verbal behaviors were taken into account. 
Similarly, in the present study, both nonverbal and verbal responses of liars and truth tellers 
were investigated. However, the present study differs from Vrij et al.'s (2000) study in 
several ways. Perhaps the most important difference was that in the present study apart from 
adults (undergraduates) children also participated, and this seems the first study in which 
truthful and deceptive verbal and nonverbal behaviors of both children and adults were 
investigated and compared.  
 Research examining children's nonverbal behavior relating to deceit is rare, and less 
than a handful of studies have been published to date (see Vrij, 2002, for a review). Child 
deception research has mainly focused on questions such as whether children lie, why they 
lie and when they lie (Frank, 1992). At the same time, examining children's behavior while 
lying is important for both theoretical and practical reasons, the latter due at least in part to 
the fact that police officers, social workers, judges and juries are sometimes confronted with 
the question of whether a child is lying or telling the truth.  
 Theoretical Reasons to Explain Deceptive Nonverbal Behavior 
 Three perspectives (the emotional, cognitive complexity and attempted behavioral 
control perspectives) seem particularly important for predicting and explaining nonverbal 
deceptive behavior (DePaulo, Stone, & Lassiter, 1985; Vrij, 2000; Zuckerman, DePaulo, & 
Rosenthal, 1981). Research has revealed that there is no typical deceptive behavior (DePaulo, 
 Deceptive responses           
 
3
Lindsay, Malone, Muhlenbruck, Charlton, & Cooper, in press; Vrij, 2000). Some behaviors, 
however, are more likely than others to occur during deception, depending on emotions 
experienced by the liar (Ekman, 1992), cognitive load experienced by the liar (Burgoon, 
Buller, & Guerrero, 1995; Cody, Marston, & Foster, 1984; Ekman, 1997, Ekman & Friesen, 
1972), and the amount of effort liars exert in controlling their behavior (Buller & Burgoon, 
1996; Burgoon & Buller, 1994; Burgoon, Buller, White, Afifi, & Buslig, 1999; DePaulo & 
Kirkendol, 1989; Hocking & Leathers, 1980; Krauss, 1981). 
 All three processes may occur simultaneously. That is, liars could be nervous, having 
to think hard, and trying to control themselves all at the same time. Which of these processes 
is most prevalent should depend on the type of lie. That is, liars will be more nervous when 
the stakes (negative consequences of getting caught and positive consequences of 
succeeding) are high, hence, nervous behaviors are more likely to occur in high-stakes lies 
(Ekman, 1992; Frank & Ekman, 1997). Liars have to think harder when the lie is 
complicated, therefore indicators of cognitive load are more likely to occur in complicated 
lies than in easy lies (McCornack, 1997). Liars who are motivated not to get caught may try 
harder to make an honest impression than those who are less motivated, therefore, attempts to 
control behavior may especially occur in motivated liars (Burgoon & Floyd, 2000; DePaulo 
& Kirkendol, 1989). 
 The best liars are probably those who manage to suppress signs of nervousness and 
cognitive load and who manage to exhibit, even under difficult circumstances, behavior that 
looks natural. In order to display natural behavior, three factors are important (Vrij, 2000). 
First, liars should realize that observers watch their behavior to detect deceit. Second, liars 
should know which behaviors make an honest impression on others, and, third, liars should 
be able to control their behavior. The first two issues imply that the effective liar should be 
able to "take the role of the other", an ability which is largely lacking in young children 
(Flavell, Botkin, Fry, Wright, & Jarvis, 1968). This might suggest that more cues of 
nervousness and more cues of cognitive load can be expected in younger children when lying 
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than in older children and adults, because younger children will not try so hard to suppress 
these cues. 
 Children's muscular control ability increases with age as well (Ekman, Roper, & 
Hager, 1980; Feldman & Phillipot, 1993). For example, Ekman et al. (1980) studied five-, 
nine- and thirteen-year-olds and found that older children have a greater ability to 
deliberately produce the component actions involved in facial expression. These findings 
might also suggest that with increased age, fewer cues of emotions or cognitive load are 
likely to occur. 
 DePaulo and Jordan (1982), however, have argued that younger children may 
experience less emotion when lying. For example, because of their young age they might be 
less affected by feelings of guilt, and might overlook the consequences of getting caught 
more often and so experience less fear of getting caught. Also, with increasing age, children 
show more spontaneous facial emotional expressions, which they need to suppress in order to 
conceal deceit (Morency & Krauss, 1982). Therefore, older children's and adults' role-taking 
skills, and increased muscular control that improves their skills in deception may well be 
counteracted in part by an increase in emotions and an increase in emotional expression while 
lying. 
 In the present experiment, participants (5-6-year-olds, 10-11-year-olds, 14-15-year-
olds and undergraduates) lied or told the truth about playing a game of Connect 4 (a popular 
game in the UK for all ages) and wiping a blackboard. Truth tellers were asked to recall 
truthfully their activities whereas liars were requested to fabricate a story. Fabricating such a 
lie probably requires some thinking, and liars, compared to truth tellers, are therefore more 
likely to show behaviors that indicate cognitive load. In order to induce emotions, 
participants were promised a reward when they could convince the interviewer that they were 
telling the truth and were told that they could expect a punishment if they failed to convince 
the interviewer. This might result in signs of nervousness, such as gaze aversion and 
fidgeting, perhaps most likely in the youngest participants, although this is in no way certain 
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given our comments above. 
 Previous research has indicated that several behaviors are associated with cognitive 
load (Burgoon, Kelly, Newton, & Keeley-Dyreson, 1989; Ekman & Friesen, 1972; Goldman-
Eisler, 1968; Köhnken, 1989; Vrij, 2000), and on the basis of these findings we hypothesized 
that:  
H1: Liars (both adults and children) will show fewer movements, slower speech rate, 
more pauses, more speech disturbances, and a longer latency time than truth tellers.1   
 Apart from a cognitive load based Deception effect, an Age Group effect might occur. 
Children's nonverbal presentation style differs from the style typically exhibited by adults. 
For example, children show more limb movements than adults (Eaton, McKeen, & Campbell, 
2001). It is also possible that children will find the interview task more difficult than adults, 
and therefore some age differences in behaviors which indicate cognitive load might emerge. 
It was therefore hypothesized that: 
H2: Children will show more limb movements, a longer latency time, slower speech rate, 
more pauses, and more speech disturbances than adults. 
 Verbal Behaviors Relating to Deception 
 Children below the age of five do not yet engage in complicated verbal deception 
(Newton, Reddy, & Bull, 2000). Their lies typically take the form of one-word responses 
(Bussey, 1992), not providing information (Peskin, 1992), or pointing in the wrong direction 
(Russell, Mauthner, Sharpe, & Tidswell, 1991; Sodian, 1991). When they get older, however, 
children's lies become more verbally sophisticated. 
 Differences between liars and truth tellers in what they say can be assessed with 
Statement Validity Analysis (SVA), and such assessments form part of experts' reports to 
criminal courts in several countries, including the United States (Honts, 1994; Ruby & 
Brigham, 1997), Sweden (Gumpert & Lindblad, 2001) and Germany (Köhnken, 2002). The 
core of SVA is Criteria-Based Content Analysis (CBCA), a systematic assessment of the 
credibility of written statements. Steller and Köhnken (1989) compiled a list of 19 criteria 
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used in the assessment.2 CBCA is based on the hypothesis, originally advanced by Undeutsch 
(1967), that a statement derived from memory of an actual experience differs in content and 
quality from a statement based on invention or fantasy (the "Undeutsch Hypothesis", Steller, 
1989). The presence of each criterion strengthens the probability that the account is based on 
genuine personal experience. In other words, truthful statements will be characterized by 
more of the elements measured by CBCA than deceptive statements. Köhnken (1989, 1996, 
1999) presented a theoretical foundation for the Undeutsch Hypothesis and proposed that 
both cognitive and motivational factors influence CBCA scores. 
 With regard to cognitive factors, it is assumed that, compared to those who fabricate a 
story, those who actually experience an event will be able to produce descriptions about those 
events which include more CBCA criteria, as some criteria (unstructured production, 
contextual embedding, reproduction of speech, unusual details, etc.) are believed to be 
difficult for people to fabricate. For example, regarding unstructured production, truth tellers 
sometimes tend to give their account in unstructured and incoherent ways, particularly when 
they talk about emotional events (Boychuk, 1991; Lamb, Sternberg, Esplin, Hershkowitz, 
Orbach, & Hovav, 1997; Winkel, Vrij, Koppelaar, & van der Steen, 1991). On the other 
hand, liars tend to tell their stories in a more chronological order than truth tellers (Zaparniuk, 
Yuille, & Taylor, 1995), as it is often too difficult for them to tell a fabrication in a different 
order (Köhnken, 1999; Steller, 1989). 
 Other message features indexed by the CBCA criteria are more likely to occur in 
truthful statements for motivational reasons. Truthful persons tend not to be as concerned 
with impression management as deceivers. Compared to truth tellers, deceivers are more 
keen to try to construct a report which they believe will make a credible impression on 
others, and will leave out information which, in their view, will damage their image of being 
a sincere person (Köhnken, 1999). As a result, a truthful person's statement is more likely to 
contain information that is inconsistent with the stereotypes of truthfulness. The CBCA list 
includes several so-called "contrary-to stereotype" criteria (Ruby & Brigham, 1998): 
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"spontaneous corrections," "admitting lack of memory," "raising doubts about one's own 
testimony," etc. For example, liars who claimed to have seen non-existing persons near the 
scene of the crime, might be reluctant to include spontaneous corrections in their stories ("He 
wore black trousers, no sorry, they were green") as they might be afraid that this will make 
their stories sound less convincing. 
 CBCA/SVA was developed (in Germany) in order to evaluate the statements from 
children who are witnesses or alleged victims, most commonly of sexual abuse. Many 
authors have described CBCA as a technique solely developed to evaluate statements made 
by children in sexual offense trials (e.g., Honts, 1994; Horowitz, Lamb, Esplin, Boychuk, 
Krispin, & Reiter-Lavery, 1997). Others, however, advocate the additional use of the 
technique to evaluate the testimonies of adults who talk about issues other than sexual abuse 
(Köhnken, Schimossek, Aschermann, & Höfer, 1995; Porter & Yuille, 1996; Ruby & 
Brigham, 1997; Steller & Köhnken, 1989). The latter group of authors have pointed out that 
the underlying Undeutsch Hypothesis is restricted neither to children, witnesses and victims, 
nor to sexual abuse. This point of view has received some empirical support to date. 
Significantly higher CBCA scores for truth tellers than for liars have not only been found in 
studies with child witnesses (e.g., Akehurst, Köhnken, & Höfer, 2001; Lamb, Sternberg, 
Esplin, Hershkowitz, & Orbach, 1997; Lamb et al., 1997a; Lamers-Winkelman & Buffing, 
1996; Tye, Amoto, Honts, Kevitt, & Peters, 1999; Winkel & Vrij, 1995) but also in studies 
with adult witnesses (e.g., Akehurst et al., 2001; Höfer, Akehurst, & Metzger, 1996; 
Köhnken et al., 1995; Landry & Brigham, 1992; Porter & Yuille, 1996; Ruby & Brigham, 
1998; Sporer, 1997; Vrij, Edward, & Bull, 2001b).3 
  Therefore, in the present study we predicted that:  
H3: CBCA scores would be significantly higher for truth tellers than for liars in both adult 
statements and child statements.  
 Cognitive abilities and command of language develop throughout childhood, making 
it gradually easier to provide detailed accounts of what has been witnessed (Davies, 1994). 
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Also, children are probably less aware or are less concerned with impression management 
than adults (Flavell et al., 1968; Vrij, 2002) and may not fully realize yet that brief accounts 
might look suspicious. It was therefore predicted that: 
H4: Older participants would have higher CBCA scores than younger participants. 
 Recently, Reality Monitoring has been used as an alternative method to examine 
verbal differences between responses believed to be true and false (Alonso-Quecuty, 1992, 
1996; Alonso-Quecuty, Hernandez-Fernaud, & Campos, 1997; Höfer et al., 1996; Manzanero 
& Diges, 1996; Roberts, Lamb, Zale, & Randall, 1998; Sporer, 1997; Vrij et al., 2000; Vrij et 
al., 2001b). The core of Reality Monitoring is the claim that memories of experienced events 
differ in quality from memories of imagined (e.g., fabricated) events. Memories of real 
experiences are obtained through perceptual processes and are therefore likely to contain, 
amongst others, perceptual information: details of smell, taste or touch, visual details and 
auditory details (details of sound) and contextual information: spatial details (details about 
where the event took place, and details about how objects and people were situated in relation 
to each other, e.g., "He stood behind me"), and temporal details (details about time order of 
the events, e.g., "First he switched on the video-recorder and then the TV", and details about 
duration of events). Accounts of imagined events are derived from an internal source and are 
therefore likely to contain cognitive operations, such as thoughts and reasonings ("I must 
have had my coat on, as it was very cold that night") (Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993; 
Johnson & Raye, 1981, 1998). One might argue that "experienced events" reflect truth telling 
whereas "imagined events" reflect deception. Therefore, differences between truth tellers and 
liars could be expected regarding Reality Monitoring criteria. It was hypothesized that: 
H5: Truth tellers are likely to include more perceptual and contextual information in their 
statements than liars.  
H6: Liars are likely to include more cognitive operations in their statements than truth 
tellers.  
 Regarding Hypothesis 6, previous studies often have failed to find the expected 
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difference between liars and truth tellers regarding cognitive operations (Alonso-Quecuty, 
1992, 1996; Höfer et al., 1996; Vrij et al., 2000, 2001b). This might have been caused by the 
nature of the event. For example, in Vrij et al.'s (2000, 2001b) studies, participants were 
requested to give truthful or deceptive factual accounts of aspects of a film they had seen. 
This allows little room for cognitive operations. Truth tellers were asked to recall and liars 
were asked to fabricate what people in the film were doing, not what they, themselves, were 
thinking. Cognitive operations, however, are related to people's own thinking rather than 
recall of factual information about others. In the present study, participants were asked to 
describe their own activities during a certain period of time which provides more opportunity 
to include reports of cognitive operations. 
 For the same reason that we expected age differences in CBCA scores (i.e., cognitive 
abilities and command of language develop throughout childhood which makes it gradually 
easier to provide detailed accounts), we expected age differences in Reality Monitoring 
scores as well: 
H7: The older participants would have a higher RM score than the younger participants. 
 Finally, the study was designed to ascertain whether a combination of the two verbal 
indices (i.e., CBCA and RM) and the nonverbal cues would classify liars and truth tellers 
more accurately than any of the techniques separately. A combination of techniques takes 
more information into account (both nonverbal and verbal) than the separate techniques, and, 
the more characteristics of lies that are scrutinized, the more likely it is that they will be 
detected. It was therefore hypothesized that: 
H8: A combination of the two verbal techniques (CBCA and RM) and the nonverbal 
technique would result in superior hit rates for classifying liars and truth tellers than 
any of the three approaches alone. 
 Method 
 Participants 
 A total of 196 participants took part in the study (55% males). Their mean age was 
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M=14.16 years, SD=6.28. There were four different age groups: 35 5-6-year-olds (16 males 
and 19 females, all but one were 6 years old), 54 10-11-year-olds (22 males and 32 females, 
all but one were 11 years old), 55 14-15-year-olds (32 males and 23 females, 7 14-year-olds 
and 48 15-year-olds), and 52 undergraduate students (38 males and 14 females, M=22.37 
years, SD = 5.1). 
 Procedure 
 The experiment took place at a Students' Union (for undergraduates) and at two local 
schools (for children). Undergraduates were recruited under the guise of participating in an 
experiment about "telling a convincing story" with the possibility of earning £5 
(approximately $7.5). Children were asked by their teacher to go to see "a woman to play a 
game." Participants participated individually. After entering the experimental room, the 
female experimenter made a fairly brief, polite conversation (exchanged names, What have 
you been doing?, Do you know how to play Connect 4?, etc.). From that moment events 
differed for the participants depending on which of the two conditions (lying or truth telling) 
they were in. Random assignment was made to these conditions. 
 Participants in the truthful condition (N = 102) played a game of Connect 4 with the 
experimenter (all 196 participants in this study knew how to play this game). During the 
game, a confederate (we used different persons, see below) entered the room, said "Hello", 
and "Excuse me for interrupting", and also said "Ah! You are playing Connect 4, I'm 
hopeless at that game, I always lose!", walked to the blackboard and erased some information 
(complicated math formulas) off the blackboard, and then left the room. The experimenter 
remained immersed in the game. However, after the game she looked at the blackboard and 
noticed that the information had been erased. She then asked the participant whether he or 
she saw who erased the information. All participants in this condition told the experimenter 
that the person who came in during the game erased the blackboard. Then, the experimenter 
gave the following instructions: Actually, I know that the information should not have been 
wiped off the blackboard, as it is needed for a lesson later on. In a minute you will be 
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interviewed by another woman. Her task is to find out who wiped the information off the 
blackboard. Now, you know you did see who it was, so your task is to convince her that you 
did. All you need to do is be truthful about everything that happened while you were in this 
room. So say that we played a game of Connect 4 and that someone came in to wipe the 
blackboard. This is very important as, if you are successful in convincing her that you are 
telling the truth, we will give you (undergraduates - £5; 14-15-year-olds - £2; 10-11-year-
olds - £2; 5-6-year-olds - present). At the end of the interview, she will tell you whether she 
believes you or not. If she does believe that we played Connect 4 and that someone came in 
to wipe the blackboard, we will give you the money/present when you come out. If she 
doesn't believe you, you will not get any money/present at all and that you might have to 
write a statement about everything that happened.4 
 Participants in the deception condition (N = 94) were told by the experimenter that 
she (the experimenter) had earlier wiped some important information off the blackboard 
which was supposed to stay there for a lesson later on. The participants were told that they 
would be interviewed by another woman whose task was to find out who wiped the 
information off the blackboard. The experimenter then asked the participants to pretend that 
it wasn't the experimenter who wiped the information off the blackboard. Instead the 
participants were asked to pretend that they (experimenter and participant) played Connect 4 
and that someone else entered the room and erased the information during the game. Identical 
to the truthful condition, it was stressed that if the participant was successful in convincing 
the interviewer that it was someone else (other than the experimenter or participant) who 
erased the information from the blackboard, he or she would receive £5/£2/present, and that 
he or she would receive nothing at all and might have to write a statement about everything 
that happened if the interviewer did not believe the participant. Again, participants were 
informed that the interviewer would tell the participants at the end of the interview whether 
or not she believed them.5 
 The participants were then given the opportunity to prepare themselves for the 
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interview.6 After the participants indicated that they were ready for the interview, they were 
shown into the interview room. The (female) interviewer was unaware of the experimental 
condition (truthful or deception) for each participant. After building rapport with each 
participant, the interviewer gave the following instructions: The reason I am interviewing you 
is that I have heard that someone wiped some important information off the blackboard in the 
room you were just in. I understand that you were in there just now with (name of 
experimenter). I need to know if you saw anything that will help me to find out who it was. 
Also, remember that my colleagues need to know whether I think you are telling the truth or 
not.7 If you do not know the answer to one of my questions please do not be afraid to say you 
don't know. If you don't understand one of my questions please let me know and I will try to 
explain what I mean. If I ask you the same question twice do not worry. It is not that you got 
it wrong the first time. First of all, I would like you to tell me, in as much detail as possible, 
everything you can remember about what happened when you were in that room just now. 
Give me as much information as you can, even small details you do not think are very 
important. 
 After the free recall, three further questions were asked. (However, a question was not 
asked if the topic of the question had not been mentioned in the free report): (1) "So you 
played a game? Can you tell me again, in lots of detail exactly what happened when you 
played the game?, (2) And you said you were interrupted by someone coming in? Can you 
tell me again, as much as you can remember about what the person looked like?, (3) And 
lastly, can you tell me, in lots of detail, exactly what the person who interrupted did?" 
 After this interview the interviewer told each participant that they had convinced her 
(the interviewer) that they told the truth. For ethical reasons the interviewer was instructed to 
tell all children that she believed them, regardless of how convincing their stories were. With 
regard to the undergraduates, she was instructed not to give money to any who gave very 
short statements. However, all undergraduates put effort in giving extensive and credible 
statements (as did all other participants), and each was paid £5. The average length of the 
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deceptive and truthful interviews were M = 106.77 seconds (SD = 44.1) and M = 116.07 
seconds (SD = 47.5) respectively. The difference in length between the truthful and deceptive 
interviews was not significant, F(1, 194) = 2.01, ns.8 
 CBCA Scoring 
 Two raters received training in CBCA scoring. Both raters first read several major 
published papers about CBCA (Raskin & Esplin, 1991; Steller, 1989; Steller & Köhnken, 
1989; Vrij, 2000; Vrij & Akehurst, 1998). They were then trained in CBCA scoring by a 
British CBCA expert. The expert explained each criterion under investigation in this study 
(see below) and gave examples of each criterion. Third, both the trainee raters and the expert 
evaluated one example transcript individually (from a different study). These three raters 
compared their results and feedback was given by the expert rater. Fourth, the trainees 
received more transcripts and were asked to rate these transcripts at home. In a follow up 
meeting, the results were evaluated and, again, feedback was given by the expert. After that 
meeting the expert felt that the two raters had been adequately trained, and it was decided 
that they could commence their coding task for the present experiment. Coding was carried 
out individually by the two trained coders (they coded the statements at home) and involved 
written transcripts of the interviews. The raters were blind to the hypotheses under 
investigation, to the staged event, and to the experimental conditions (although they were 
aware that some scripts would be truthful and some not). Some criteria ("accurately reported 
details misunderstood," "pardoning the perpetrator" and "details characteristic of the offense" 
were not scored, as they are specifically related to (sexual) crimes. "Superfluous details," 
"related external associations" and "self deprecations" were to be scored but, in fact, were 
never present. They were therefore disregarded, leaving a total of 13 CBCA criteria to be 
assessed. CBCA scoring took place in two different ways. The coders scored the strength of 
presence of each criterion in each statement, 1 = absent, 5 = is strongly present (see also 
Akehurst et al., 2001; Köhnken, 1999; Köhnken et al., 1995). They also scored the frequency 
of occurrence of each criterion in each statement (although this was not possible for the 
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criteria "logical structure" and "unstructured production" which are general criteria). Pearson 
correlations were calculated between the two coders: logical structure, r(scale) = .49; 
unstructured production, r(scale) = .08; quantity of details, r(scale) = .56, r(frequency) = .90,; 
contextual embedding, r(scale) = .76, r(frequency) = .93; description of interactions, r(scale) 
= .55, r(frequency) = .58; reproduction of conversation, r(scale) = .52, r(frequency) = .62; 
unexpected complications, r(scale) = .30, r(frequency) = .51; unusual details, r(scale) = .05, 
r(frequency) = .17; subjective mental state, r(scale) = .68, r(frequency) = .61; attribution of 
other's mental state, r(scale) = .20, r(frequency) = .21; spontaneous corrections, r(scale) = .57, 
r(frequency) = .71; admitting lack of memory, r(scale) = .66, r(frequency) = .63; raising 
doubts about one's own memory, r(scale) = .68, r(frequency) = .78.9 
 The correlations indicate that "frequency scoring"' gave higher correlations between 
raters than "'scale scoring." This is intriguing (but not surprising, see endnote 9) since "scale 
scoring" is the common practice in CBCA assessments. Moreover, most correlations were 
lower than we have obtained in the past (Vrij, Edward, & Bull, 2001a, b; Vrij et al., 2000), 
although higher than some others have found (e.g., Anson, Golding, & Gully, 1993). There 
are several reasons why some of the correlations may have been low: (1) some statements 
(particularly of 5-6-year-olds) were rather short which made it difficult to score criteria such 
as "unstructured production," (2) some criteria ("unusual details" and "attribution of other 
person's mental state") rarely occurred (in less than 10% of the statements), and (3) the 
questions the interviewer asked often resulted in participants repeating some information they 
had already given which probably made the task more difficult for CBCA coders because 
common practice (Köhnken, 1999; Steller, 1989; Steller & Köhnken, 1989) requires that 
repetitions should not be counted. However, sometimes new information was embedded in a 
repetition, which should be scored, but could easily have been overlooked by (one of) the 
coders. 
 Nevertheless, the correlations reveal acceptable interrater reliability scores (r's > .49, 
Anson et al., 1993; Fleiss, 1981) for nine criteria: logical structure, quantity of details, 
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contextual embedding, description of interactions, reproduction of conversation, accounts of 
subjective mental state, spontaneous corrections, admitting lack of memory, and raising 
doubts about one's own memory. Following previous examples (Craig, Scheibe, Raskin, 
Kircher, & Dodd, 1999; Hershkowitz, Lamb, Sternberg, & Esplin, 1997; Lamb et al., 1997a, 
b; Parker & Brown, 2000; Tye et al., 1999; Vrij et al., 2000, 2001a, b), we calculated a total 
CBCA score on the basis of these nine criteria. The total CBCA score was the combined 
score of the nine criteria on the 5-point scales and therefore could range from 9 to 45. In 
order to check reliability for the total CBCA score, total scores for both coders were 
calculated. The correlation between these two CBCA scores was very high (.85). This result 
is consistent with previous studies where interrater agreement ratings on a total CBCA score 
are higher than the interrater agreement ratings on individual criteria (see Vrij & Akehurst, 
1998, for a discussion of this issue). In the present analyses we used as total CBCA score the 
average score of the two coders. 
 RM Scoring 
 Two other raters received training in Reality Monitoring (RM) scoring. A British RM 
expert (another person than the CBCA expert) provided the raters with a detailed description 
of how the criteria should be scored, including some case examples. Then, both the trainee 
raters and the expert evaluated some example transcripts individually (from a different 
study). The three raters compared their results and feedback was given by the expert. At this 
stage the expert and the two raters felt that the raters were capable of scoring the transcripts 
without any further instructions. This is in agreement with Sporer (1997) who also found that 
it is much easier to teach (and to learn) RM scoring than CBCA scoring. With regard to the 
present study, coding was carried out individually by the two trained raters (they coded the 
statements at home) and involved the written transcripts of the interviews. The raters were 
blind to the hypotheses under investigation, to the staged event, and to the experimental 
condition (although they were aware that some scripts would be truthful and some would be 
not). The two raters scored per interview the frequency of occurrence of visual details (e.g., 
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"I walked in to the room" contains three visual details), auditory details (e.g., "She said to sit 
down" contains one sound detail), temporal details (e.g., "We started playing" is one 
temporal detail), spatial details (e.g., "And then the pieces fell on to the floor" contains one 
spatial detail) and cognitive operations (e.g., "Because she was quite clever, she won the 
game" contains one cognitive operation; so does "I presume that the two people knew each 
other" and "She was quite tall for a girl"). Intercoder reliability scores (Pearson's correlations) 
were satisfactory for all the individual criteria (visual details: r=.80; auditory details: r=.92; 
spatial details: r=.61; temporal details: r=.78; cognitive operations: r=.54). The scores for 
each of the criteria were therefore based on the average scores of the two raters. 
 Following previous examples (Vrij et al., 2000, 2001b) a RM total score was 
calculated. In order to create the RM scale the visual, auditory, spatial and temporal variables 
were dichotomized (see also Vrij et al., 2000, 2001b).10 Dichotomizations for auditory, 
temporal and spatial details were based on the absence or presence of each of the criteria in 
the interview. A score of 0 was assigned when the criterion was absent, and a score of 1 when 
the criterion was present. For dichotomization of visual details, a median split was used.11 
Those 5-6-year-olds (N = 18) with a score higher than 18.00 obtained 1 on this criterion, the 
other 17 5-6-year-olds obtained a score of 0. Those remaining participants (10-11-year-olds, 
14-15-year-olds and undergraduates) with a score higher than 37.50 (N = 80) for visual 
details obtained a 1 on the visual details criterion, whereas the 81 remaining participants 
received a score of 0. Cognitive operations was not included in the total RM score as this 
criterion is conceptually different from the other criteria: Its presence does not indicate truth 
telling (as is the case with the other criteria), but lying. The RM scale therefore contained 
four criteria (visual details, auditory details, spatial details and temporal details) and the total-
score could range from 0 to 4. Throughout this article, the total RM score refers to the RM 
score without cognitive operations.12 
 Nonverbal Behavior Scoring 
 Two other observers coded the nonverbal behavior of the participants independently 
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by watching the videotaped interviews. The observers were not informed as to when the 
participants were lying and when they were telling the truth. Neither were they informed 
about the hypotheses or the staged event. They used a coding system previously employed in 
a number of studies (Akehurst & Vrij, 1999; Vrij, 1991, 1995; Vrij, Akehurst, & Morris, 
1997; Vrij, Semin, & Bull, 1996; Vrij et al., 2000, 2001a, b). The following behaviors were 
coded13 (speech hesitations and speech errors were scored on the basis of a typed verbatim 
text): gaze aversion (number of seconds for which the participant looked away from the 
interviewer, r = .84); illustrators (frequency of arm and hand movements which were 
designed to modify and supplement what was being said, Ekman & Friesen, 1969, r = .93); 
adaptors (frequency of scratching the head, wrists, etc. Rubbing one's hands together were 
not coded as adaptors but as hand and finger movements, r = .73); hand and finger 
movements (frequency of movements of the hands or fingers without moving the arms, r = 
.81); foot and leg movements (frequency of movements of feet or legs. Simultaneous 
movements of feet and legs were scored as one movement, r = .86); speech hesitations 
(frequency of saying 'ah' or 'mm' between words, r = .99); speech errors (frequency of word 
or sentence repetition, sentence change, sentence incompletion, and slips of the tongue, r = 
.89); latency period (period of time between the question being asked and the answer given, r 
= .78); speech rate (number of spoken words divided by the length of interview minus latency 
period). 
 The Pearson's correlations indicate considerable agreement between the two coders, 
and composite scores were taken as the average of the two coders. Following Eaton et al. 
(2001) different types of limb movements (illustrators, adaptors, hand and finger movements 
and foot and leg movements) were clustered into one category: limb movements. Two 
reasons were behind this clustering. First, it reduced the number of dependent variables and, 
second, we felt that distinguishing between different types of movement was less appropriate 
for the very young children (see also Eaton et al., 2001). Following Kasl and Mahl (1965) 
(and again to reduce the number of variables), speech hesitations and speech errors were 
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clustered in to one category: speech disturbances. If relevant, results for the original 
behaviors are given in the discussion of the results. The reported duration and frequencies of 
all categories of nonverbal behavior were corrected for the length of the interviews or for the 
number of spoken words. Patterns listed for gaze aversion, limb movements, frequency of 
pauses, latency period and speech rate were calculated on a per minute basis. Patterns for 
speech disturbances were calculated per 100 words. 
 Results 
 Verbal and Nonverbal Responses: Age Differences and  
 Differences between Liars and Truth Tellers 
 In order to examine participants' verbal and nonverbal responses, we first looked at 
the total RM scores (which does not contain cognitive operations) and total CBCA scores. 
Two ANOVAs were conducted with Age Group and Veracity as between-subjects factors 
and the total CBCA and total RM scores as dependent variables. Significant main effects for 
Age Group and Veracity emerged in both ANOVAs (see Tables 1 and 2), whereas both Age 
Group X Veracity interaction effects were not significant, F(3, 188) = .92, ns (CBCA) and 
F(3, 188) = .89, ns (RM). Tukey HSD post hoc tests were conducted to further investigate the 
significant findings. Regarding the Age Group factor, the CBCA scores of the youngest age 
group were significantly lower than the CBCA scores of the remaining three groups, and the 
CBCA scores of the oldest age group were significantly higher than the CBCA scores of the 
remaining three groups (see Table 1). The CBCA scores of the two middle groups did not 
differ significantly from each other and were significantly higher than the CBCA score of the 
youngest age group and significantly lower than the CBCA score of the oldest age group. 
This provides support for Hypothesis 4. 
 With regard to the total RM score, the youngest age group obtained the lowest score 
and this score was significantly lower than the scores of each of the three remaining groups 
(see Table 1). The scores for these three groups did not differ from each other. This provides 
support for Hypothesis 7. 
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 Regarding the Veracity factor (see Table 2), truth tellers obtained a higher total 
CBCA score and a higher total RM score than liars, which supports Hypotheses 3 and 5. 
 In order to examine the individual verbal and nonverbal responses, a MANOVA was 
carried out with Age Group and Veracity as between-subjects factors and the nine CBCA 
criteria, five RM criteria, and six nonverbal responses as dependent variables. At a 
multivariate level the analyses revealed a significant main effect for Age Group, Wilks' 
lambda = .17, F(60, 505) = 6.72, p < .01, eta2 = .44, a significant main effect for Veracity, 
Wilks' lambda = .73, F(20, 169) = 3.10, p < .01, eta2 = .27, and a significant Age Group X 
Veracity interaction effect, Wilks' lambda = .64, F(60, 505) = 1.38, p < .05, eta2 = .14. 
Regarding the Age Group factor, at a univariate level almost all effects were significant. 
Tukey HSD post hoc tests were conducted to further investigate the significant findings (see 
also Table 1). 
 With regard to the verbal responses (CBCA and RM), the lowest scores were always 
obtained by the youngest age group and, except for visual details, the highest scores were 
always obtained by the oldest age group. With the exception of "admitting lack of memory," 
the score of the oldest age group was always significantly higher than the score for the 
youngest age group. The scores for the two middle age groups did not differ significantly 
from each other. They were typically between the scores of the two extreme age groups, and 
in some cases significantly higher than the youngest age group but significantly lower than 
the oldest age group. These findings reveal an age effect as was predicted in Hypotheses 4 
and 7.  
 Regarding nonverbal responses, similar to the verbal responses, the most extreme 
scores were obtained by the youngest and oldest participants. The youngest participants 
showed most gaze aversion, although their score differed significantly only from the 10-11 
year-olds. The youngest age group had the longest latency period, significantly longer than 
any of the other three groups, which is in agreement with Hypothesis 2. They also had the 
slowest speech, and their speech was significantly slower than the speech of the three other 
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groups, which also supports Hypothesis 2. The oldest participants made fewer limb 
movements than the other three groups (which supports Hypothesis 2)14 and, contrary to what 
was predicted in Hypothesis 2, exhibited more speech disturbances than the other three 
groups.15 
 Table 2 shows the findings for the Veracity factor. For five of the nine CBCA criteria 
significant differences were found between truthful and deceptive accounts. All five 
differences were in the predicted direction (Hypothesis 3), with higher scores for truth tellers 
than for liars.  
 All effects with regard to the Reality Monitoring variables were significant, and all 
the differences were in the predicted direction. Compared to truth tellers, liars obtained lower 
scores for visual details, auditory details, spatial details and temporal details, which supports 
Hypothesis 5, and higher scores for cognitive operations, which supports Hypothesis 6.  
 Regarding the nonverbal responses, only one significant finding emerged: Liars 
exhibited fewer limb movements than truth tellers, which is in line with Hypothesis 1.16 
 At a univariate level, three Age Group X Veracity interaction effects were significant, 
and they were all Reality Monitoring variables; auditory details: F(3, 188) = 3.13, p < .05, 
eta2 = .05; spatial details: F(3, 188) = 3,23, p < .05. eta2 = .05; temporal details: F(3, 188) = 
3.10, p < .05, eta2= .05. For each of the three variables, the pattern was the same. For each 
age group, fewer auditory, spatial and temporal details were present during deception than 
during truth telling. For each detail, the largest differences were found for college students, 
whereas the details were not often present in the statements of either truthful or lying 5-6-
year-olds.17  
 Table 3 shows differences between truth tellers and liars for each age group. In order 
to reduce the number of variables, only the total CBCA score and total RM score are 
included in Table 3 together with cognitive operations and limb movements, the only two 
remaining variables which obtained a significant Veracity effect (see Table 2). The pattern of 
means are very consistent and all are in the predicted direction, however, not all effects were 
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significant. As can be seen in Table 3, CBCA scores were higher for truth tellers than for 
liars in each of the four age groups. The differences were significant for the youngest and the 
oldest age groups and were marginally significant for 10-11-year-olds. 
 Total RM scores were higher for truth tellers than for liars in each of the four age 
groups and the differences were significant for the oldest age group and 14-15-year-olds and 
marginally significant for 10-11-year-olds. 
 In all four age groups liars reported more cognitive operations than truth tellers, but 
the difference was only significant for the 14-15-year-olds. 
 In all four age groups, liars made fewer limb movements than truth tellers, and the 
differences were significant for the youngest and oldest age groups.18 
 Classifying Liars and Truth Tellers 
 In order to determine the usefulness of the detection techniques in classifying truth 
tellers and liars, stepwise discriminant analyses utilizing the Wilks' Lambda method were 
conducted. With this technique the variables remaining in the final analysis are those which 
contribute to maximizing the correct assignment of the cases to the objective truth status. In 
the analyses, the objective truth status was the classifying variable and the six nonverbal 
behaviors, plus total CBCA score, total RM score, and cognitive operations were the 
dependent variables. Analyses were carried out for the whole sample and additionally per age 
group. The results are given in Table 4.19 
 Hypothesis 8, a combination of the two verbal techniques and the nonverbal 
technique would result in the most accurate classifications, received strong support. The 
combined detection technique was the only technique which resulted in significant 
discriminant functions in all four year groups. Moreover, in each age group the combined 
technique resulted in the highest total hit rate. These hit rates varied from a modest 65% for 
10-11-year-olds to a very high 88% for undergraduates (and 89% hit rate for lie detection and 
88% hit rate for truth detection). Also in the discriminant analysis for the whole sample, the 
combined technique resulted in the highest hit rate. 
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 However, for each age group a different set of variables contributed to the 
discriminant function. In 5-6-year-olds, four variables (total CBCA score, Wilks' lambda = 
.82, limb movements, Wilks' lambda = .71, cognitive operations, Wilks' lambda = .63, and 
speech disturbances, Wilks' lambda = .60), contributed to the significant discriminant 
function; in 10-11-year-olds three variables (latency time, Wilks' lambda = .90, total CBCA 
score, Wilks' lambda = .88, and cognitive operations, Wilks' lambda = .84); in 14-15-year-
olds five variables (cognitive operations, Wilks' lambda = .77, total RM score, Wilks' lambda 
= .60, frequency of pauses, Wilks' lambda = .56, speech disturbances, Wilks' lambda = .52, 
and limb movements, Wilks' lambda = .50), and in undergraduates seven variables (total RM 
score, Wilks' lambda = .74, frequency of pauses, Wilks' lambda = .64, cognitive operations, 
Wilks' lambda = .58, latency period, Wilks' lambda = .54, limb movements, Wilks' lambda = 
.51, total CBCA score, Wilks' lambda = .49, and gaze aversion, Wilks' lambda = .48). 
 Although there is overlap between the discriminant functions of the four age groups 
(i.e., cognitive operations appeared in all four functions, total CBCA score and limb 
movements in three functions and both are missing in the discriminant function for 10-11-
year-olds), the discriminant functions do not replicate each other. On the one hand, it might 
be that the differences in discriminant functions are caused by the age differences in 
behaviors between the four groups. Perhaps different age groups have different clusters of 
cues to deceit. On the other hand, we cannot rule out that the apparent differences may 
simply be an artifact of high multicollinearity.20 
 DePaulo, Anderson, and Cooper (1999) correctly point out that a lack of overlap 
between discriminant functions is problematic, as it does not provide a set of variables to 
reliably build upon in lie detection. In order to seek replication of previous findings obtained 
with undergraduate participants (Vrij et al., 2000), an additional discriminant analysis for 
undergraduates was conducted. This time we included the variables which were included in 
Vrij et al.'s (2000) study, which were total CBCA score, total RM score, latency period, 
speech errors, speech hesitations, speech rate, illustrators and hand/finger movements.21 Vrij 
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et al. (2000) reported a 81% total hit rate (77% truth hit rate and 85% lie hit rate) with CBCA 
score, latency period, hand and finger movements, speech hesitations, illustrators and speech 
rate contributing to the discriminant function. The results for the present experiment are 
shown in Table 4. As can be seen, the hit rates were very similar, 79% total hit rate, 77% hit 
rate for truth detection and 81% hit rate for lie detection. This time four variables contributed 
to the discriminant function, total RM score (Wilks' lambda = .74), latency period (Wilks' 
lambda = .65), hand and finger movements (Wilks' lambda = .62), and speech errors (Wilks' 
lambda = .61). In other words, there was an overlap of two cues (latency period and hand and 
finger movements), and in both analyses the cues were in the same direction. Again, the 
differences between the two discriminant functions might have been the result of 
multicollinearity. 
 Discussion 
 The present experiment examined children's and undergraduates' verbal and 
nonverbal responses during deception, and to what extent truths and lies could be correctly 
classified by paying attention to these verbal and nonverbal responses. 
 Age Differences in Verbal and Nonverbal Responses 
 Considerable age differences were found in verbal and nonverbal responses. As 
predicted in Hypothesis 4, a CBCA age effect was found, with the oldest participants 
(undergraduates) having the highest CBCA scores and the youngest participants (5-6-year-
olds) obtaining the lowest CBCA scores. In more concrete terms, the accounts of 
undergraduates were often more detailed, and were, for example, more likely to include 
descriptions of interactions ("She asked me to sit down, so I sat down"), reproductions of 
conversations ("And the woman said: do you fancy a game of Connect 4?"), and how they 
felt during the event ("I couldn't stand that I was losing that game"). They also included more 
spontaneous corrections ("She was probably five foot eleven, no, more likely five foot 
seven") and raised more doubts about their own memory ("I think she had black shoes on").  
 RM total scores for 5-6-year-olds were significantly lower than the RM total scores 
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for the other age groups (in line with Hypothesis 7). In concrete terms, it means that 5-6-year-
olds were least likely to include, for example, auditory details ("She just walked in, she didn't 
knock or anything"), temporal details ("After about four pieces went in, a lady entered the 
room") and spatial details ("She walked behind us") in their accounts. Undergraduates' scores 
for cognitive operations were significantly higher than the scores for the other three age 
groups. That is, they were more likely to include phrases such as "She was very polite," "He 
seemed very confident," "You could tell that he knew what he was doing," etc. in their 
statements. Similar to the results of verbal responses, nonverbal behavioral responses of 
children and adults differed considerably. For example, 5-6-year-olds waited longer before 
giving an answer and spoke slower than any of the other three age groups (which provide 
some support for Hypothesis 2) and undergraduates made fewer limb movements 
(particularly hand and finger movements) than any of the other three age groups, which is in 
agreement with Hypothesis 2. An unpredicted finding, for which we as yet have no plausible 
explanation, was that adults included more speech hesitations (mm's, er's, etc.) in their 
accounts than any other age group. 
 Verbal and Nonverbal Differences between Liars and Truth Tellers 
 Despite these age differences in verbal and nonverbal responses, cues to deceit were 
remarkably similar across the different age groups. For example, as was predicted in 
Hypothesis 3, in all four age groups, liars obtained lower CBCA scores than truth tellers, 
although the differences were not significant for 14-15-year-olds. We can only speculate 
about the absence of a significant CBCA deception effect for 14-15-years-olds. Perhaps, we 
did not succeed in motivating this particular age group enough. Perhaps, the prize they could 
win, (i.e., £2), was not sufficient for them to put much effort into the task. For this group a 
CBCA score in between the CBCA scores of 10-11-years-olds and undergraduates could be 
expected. However, their actual CBCA score (see Table 1) was much closer to the scores of 
10-11-year-olds, and did not differ significantly from the CBCA score of that group (but was 
significantly lower than the CBCA score of undergraduates). This suggests that the 14-15-
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year-olds underachieved. Alternatively, it might be that the game of Connect 4 was not that 
attractive for this age group compared to the other age groups. Although the game is played 
in the UK by young and old (it is, for example, a popular pub game for undergraduates), 14-
15-years-olds, might feel themselves "too old" for this game. 
 In all four age groups, liars obtained lower total RM scores than truth tellers which 
was predicted in Hypothesis 5. When analyses were conducted per age group it appeared that 
the differences were significant for the two oldest age groups, and marginally significant for 
10-11-year-olds. No significant differences emerged for 5-6-year-olds. In other words, it 
appears that RM assessments are not useful below a certain age. This reflects Reality 
Monitoring memory research (see Lindsay, 2002, for an overview). Young children are worse 
than adults in differentiating between memories of actual and imagined events. In order to 
explain this, it has been suggested that "children may be better than adults at imagining 
themselves performing actions, such that their memories of imagined and actual self-
performed actions are more similar" (Lindsay, 2002, p. 88). Since RM assessments are based 
upon differences in people's memories between actual and imagined events, it is reasonable 
that if their memories are more similar, RM assessments will be less successful in 
distinguishing truth from deception.22 
 For the first time to our knowledge, a significant difference was found between liars 
and truth tellers in cognitive operations. As was predicted in Hypothesis 6, liars included 
more of these operations in their statements than truth tellers. Also, cognitive operations was 
the only variable that appeared in the discriminant functions for each of the four Age Groups. 
These findings are noteworthy because CBCA assessments are prone to a truth bias (i.e., 
CBCA assessments are typically more accurate for detecting truths than for detecting lies; see 
Vrij, 2000, for a review of CBCA hit rates). One possible reason is that all CBCA criteria are 
"truth telling" criteria, that is, their presence might indicate that someone is telling the truth. 
The technique might result in more balanced and higher hit rates when lie telling criteria 
(criteria which indicate deception) are included. The cognitive operations criterion is an 
 Deceptive responses           
 
26
example of a lie telling criterion. The present data set supports this idea. Additional 
discriminant analyses were conducted with total CBCA score and cognitive operations as 
dependent variables. All analyses (for the total sample and for each of the four age groups) 
resulted in higher hit rates than the analyses in which just the CBCA score was included.23 
 Finally, in agreement with Hypothesis 1, in all four age groups a decrease in 
movements (particularly in hand and finger movements) occurred during deception, and this 
finding (regarding hand and finger movements) was significant for 5-6-year-olds and 
undergraduates and marginally significant for 14-15-year-olds. A decrease in hand and finger 
movements, as well as a decrease in other movements such as illustrators, has been found in 
deception research before, and they appeared in recent meta-analyses of deception research 
(DePaulo et al., in press; Vrij, 2000) as some of the very few nonverbal behaviors which 
significantly discriminated between liars and truth tellers. A possible explanation for why, in 
this study, the expected decrease in movements did occur, but other expected findings, such 
as a slower speech rate, more pauses and a longer latency period did not emerge, is that a 
decrease in movements could have been the result of two processes (cognitive load and 
attempted behavioral control), whereas the other effects could just have been the result of 
cognitive load. Perhaps, liars experienced both processes, which might have made their 
impact on movements strong enough for behavioral differences between liars and truth tellers 
to occur. 
 The popular belief that liars look away and fidget could not be supported. No 
significant differences for gaze aversion or adaptors were found for any of the four age 
groups. These findings are also consistent with prior research (DePaulo et al., in press; Vrij, 
2000). 
 Classifying Liars and Truth Tellers 
 Concerning classifying liars and truth tellers on the basis of verbal and nonverbal 
responses, two results are worth mentioning. First, hit rates based on RM assessments were 
as good as, and especially for older participants, even better than, hit rates based on CBCA 
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assessments. This makes Reality Monitoring a promising method of lie detection.  
 Second, the hit rates for a combination of verbal and nonverbal techniques were 
always higher than the hit rates for the individual verbal and nonverbal techniques, which 
supports Hypothesis 8. The combined technique resulted in a very high hit rate of 88% for 
undergraduates. Also, a combination of verbal and nonverbal responses which resulted in a 
hit rate of 81% in a previous study (Vrij et al., 2000), resulted in a hit rate of 79% in this 
study.  
 Methodological Considerations 
 Three methodological issues merit attention. First, the way we motivated participants 
might raise some concerns. Different age groups received different rewards, therefore effects 
of age were confounded with type of motivation. We varied the reward so as to avoid such a 
confound. We believe that giving all participants the same reward would have created a 
confound because the same reward (for example £5) would be perceived as substantially 
higher by young children than by undergraduates. However, it is difficult to determine what 
would be comparable rewards for different age groups, and, as discussed above, the award for 
14-15-years-olds might have been too low.  
 Also, we did not introduce different rewards and punishments for liars and truth 
tellers. We believe that sometimes the rewards and punishments for liars and truth tellers are 
identical. For example, if a mother believes that her child has finished his or her homework, 
both the honest and deceptive child might get the same reward (for example, money to go to 
the cinema), whereas if, on the other hand, the mother does not believe that the child has 
finished his or her homework, both may get the same punishment (not allowed to go out that 
night). Sometimes, however, the situation is different. For example, sometimes the liar has 
more to gain than the truth teller. The guilty suspect who has hidden stolen goods has more to 
gain by being believed (i.e., that he or she was not involved in the crime) than the innocent 
suspect who was not involved and therefore has no hidden valuables. In other words, the 
rewards and punishments for liars and truth tellers differ per situation, and it would be a very 
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difficult task to incorporate all possible situations in one experiment. With hindsight it would 
have been better to introduce a manipulation check and to ask participants to what extent they 
were motivated. We recommend the inclusion of such a motivation check in future research. 
 Second, asking participants about their motivation might have clarified another issue. 
Research has shown that people are more motivated to protect a friend than to protect a 
stranger, if necessary by telling lies (Cole, 2001; Metts, 1989), among other strategies, 
because they care more about their friends. In the present study, participants in the deceptive 
situation might have had more positive feelings towards the person they were asked to protect 
(confederate 1) than the participants in the truthful situation who had to speak about a total 
stranger (confederate 2). Although the difference in affection towards these two confederates 
was probably small (the participants in the deceptive situation did not really interact with the 
confederate they had to protect, they did not play the game of Connect 4 with that person, 
only the truth tellers did), with hindsight we could have asked participants about their affinity 
towards the confederates. 
 Finally, more self-selection might have taken place in the two oldest age groups than 
in the two youngest age groups. Specifically, because participants volunteered for a study 
about "telling a convincing story" it might be that in the older age groups mostly participants 
who thought they would be convincing signed up, whereas in the younger age groups 
parental permission to participate was the dominant factor to participate. However, self-
selection might have occurred within the younger age groups as well. Perhaps only the 
parents who believed that their children would be good at the task might have given parental 
consent to take part in the study. It is therefore not certain that self-selection differed between 
the participating age groups. Perhaps this self-selection worked in our benefit. In daily life, it 
is mostly people's own free choice to lie and people probably decide to lie only if they think 
that have a chance to get away with it, and if they think that they will be able to tell a 
convincing story. Therefore, those who believe that they will not be able to tell a convincing 
story might have decided against participation in our study, but neither are they likely to lie 
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in real-life. Obviously, deception studies with participants who almost never lie in daily life 
are ecologically less valid.  
 Future Research 
 The findings suggest that combining verbal and nonverbal lie detection methods is a 
worthwhile method of lie detection. Obviously, the question then arises which verbal and 
nonverbal cues are particularly relevant in such a combined method. We have only just 
started to investigate this, and conclusions can not be drawn at this stage. However, the 
findings so far are promising, and it might be that some suggestions can eventually be made. 
For example, in most discriminant functions discussed in this article, total CBCA scores, total 
RM scores, cognitive operations and movements were included, making these cues relevant 
cues to focus upon. Also, some cues, such as gaze aversion, are mostly absent in these 
discriminant functions, suggesting that lie detectors could ignore such cues without negative 
consequences. 
 The next step would be to investigate whether snap judgments of relevant cues will 
increase lie detection. For example, research has shown that people are particularly poor at 
detecting lies in friends and partners, due to a truth-bias, the belief that the other is telling the 
truth (Levine, Park, & McCornack, 1999; McCornack & Parks, 1986; Stiff, Kim, & Ramesh, 
1992). Making snap judgments of some relevant verbal and nonverbal cues might negate the 
tendency for a truth-bias and will therefore increase accuracy in lie detection. 
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Verbal and Nonverbal Responses as a Function of Age Group. 
                                                                                                                                                                5-6 
 10-11  14-15      undergraduates F(3, 188) eta2 
   m sd m sd m sd m sd 
                                                                                                                    
CBCA 
CBCA (total score) 16.10a 2.5 20.44b 3.0 21.28b 3.0 24.14c 4.2 47.56** .43 
logical structure  3.90a .9 4.06ab .8 4.32b .6 4.35b .6 4.68** .07 
quantity of details 2.97a .5 4.06b .6 4.05b .6 4.40c .6 46.27** .43 
contextual embedding 1.90a .9 3.19b .9 3.15b .8 3.50b .9 28.10** .31 
description of interactions 1.13a .5 1.45ab .6 1.52b .7 1.94c .8 11.68** .16 
reproduction of conversation 1.13a .3 1.66b .6 1.77bc .8 2.02c .9 12.54** .17 
accounts of own mental state 1.00a .0 1.10a .3 1.18a .5 1.51b .9 8.06** .11 
spontaneous corrections 1.59a .6 1.94ab .6 2.04b .6 2.54c .9 14.84** .19 
admitting lack of memory 1.34a .5 1.37a .5 1.38a .5 1.60a .6 2.35  
raising doubts  1.14a .3 1.60b .7 1.88b .8 2.28c .8 20.85** .25 
Reality Monitoring 
Reality Monitoring (total score) 2.37a 1.2 3.35b .9 3.27b .8 3.12b .9 11.83** .16 
visual details  19.79a 10.9 43.77b 18.5 39.63b 12.7 36.75b 17.9 19.44** .24 
auditory details  .56a 1.0 3.24b 2.7 3.54b 3.1 5.00c 4.1 17.53** .22 
spatial details  .86a .9 2.09a 1.7 1.84a 1.2 4.13b 4.6 13.51** .18 
temporal details  .67a .9 3.16b 2.5 2.85b 1.9 5.11c 3.8 22.63** .27 
cognitive operations .03a .2 .46ab .7 .65b 1.0 1.46c 1.6 15.38** .20 
nonverbal behavior 
gaze aversion  38.77b 9.3 33.94a 6.2 35.13ab 7.9 35.42ab 7.2 2.99*  .05 
movements  80.23b 26.9 82.93b 29.9 84.67b 49.1 49.40a 21.7 12.27** .16 
latency time  3.86b 5.9 1.65a 1.7 1.99a 1.6 1.71a 1.8 5.67** .08 
pauses   1.74a 1.6 1.54a .9 1.43a 1.1 1.89a 1.0 1.58 
speech disturbances 5.95a 5.3 6.75a 3.9 5.53a 3.8 11.73b 5.8 18.41** .23 
speech rate  77.32a 33.2 121.97b 34.9 135.73bc 34.0 145.41c 42.4 28.28** .31 
                                                                                                                                                              * p < .05,   ** p < .01 




Verbal and Nonverbal Responses as a Function of Veracity. 
                                                                                                                                                                 lie
   truth   F(1, 188)  eta2 
    m sd  m sd  
                                                                                                             CBCA 
CBCA (total score)  20.08 3.9  21.62 4.4  17.25**  .08 
logical structure   4.08 .8  4.27 .6  5.52*  .03 
quantity of details  3.86 .7  4.04 .8  8.93**  .05  
contextual embedding  2.86 1.0  3.19 1.1  11.27**  .06  
description of interactions  1.38 .5  1.70 .8  12.04**  .06 
reproduction of conversation  1.48 .6  1.89 .8  18.14**  .09  
accounts of own mental state  1.30 .6  1.14 .5  2.94 
spontaneous corrections  1.99 .7  2.13 .8  3.34 
admitting lack of memory  1.29 .5  1.38 .6  1.76 
raising doubts   1.76 .8  1.80 .8  .77 
Reality Monitoring 
Reality Monitoring (total score)  2.85 .9  3.36 .9  19.63**  .10 
visual details   33.0716.4  39.59 18.1  11.96**  .06 
auditory details   2.19 2.3  4.34 3.9  28.11**  .13 
spatial details   1.80 1.7  2.83 3.5  8.67**  .04 
temporal details   2.57 2.2  3.67 3.5  11.29**  .06 
cognitive operations  .97 1.3  .46 .9  8.13**  .04 
nonverbal behavior 
gaze aversion   34.84 8.1  36.17 7.3  .67 
movements   66.9530.4  80.58 41.5  7.60**  .04 
latency time   2.24 3.7  2.08 2.3  .95 
pauses    1.60 1.1  1.67 1.2  .37 
speech disturbances  8.06 5.4  7.15 5.3  1.56 
speech rate   121.4045.1  126.5441.4  3.13 
                                                                                                                                                             * p < .05,    ** p < .01 




Verbal and Nonverbal Responses for Each Age Group as a Function of Veracity. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         5-6-year-olds    10-11-y
   lie  truth    lie  truth    lie  truth    lie  truth 
   m sd m sd F eta2 m sd m sd F eta2 m sd m sd F eta2 m sd m sd F eta2 
                                                                                                                                                                                             CBCA (total score) 14.82 1.5 16.95 2.67.44** 
.18 19.71 2.8 21.21 3.1 3.54t .06 20.73 2.4 21.78 3.4 1.71  22.65 4.1 25.61 3.7 7.35** .13  
Reality Monitoring (total) 2.21 1.1 2.48 1.2 .41  3.14 1.0 3.58 .6 3.50t .06 2.88 .8 3.62 .6 14.32**.21 2.85 .7 3.58 .5 17.59** .26 
cognitive operations .07 .3 .00 .0 1.52  .57 .7 .35 .8 1.24  1.15 1.2 .21 .4 15.46**.23 1.69 1.8 1.23 1.3 1.12 
movements  69.19 25.9 87.60 25.5 4.31* .12 82.05 26.8 83.88 33.3 .05  75.72 29.4 92.70 61.1 1.66  40.71 20.0 58.08 20.0 9.78** .16 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        t .5 < p < .10,* p < .05,** p < .01 




Discriminant Analyses with Nonverbal Behavior, Criteria-Based Content Analysis and Reality Monitoring. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            hit rates 
Detection technique   lie  truth  total EigenvalueLambdadf X2 
                                                                                                                                                                                       Total sample 
CBCA1     62%  61%  61%  .04  .97  1 6.66**  
RM2     67%  72%  69%  .17  .85  2 30.51** 
Nonverbal behavior   61%  61%  61%  .05  .95  3 8.97* 
CBCA + RM + nonverbal behavior 68%  71%  69%  .25  .80  6 42.63** 
5-6-year-olds 
CBCA     64%  71%  69%  .23  .82  1 6.61*  
RM               1 1.47 
Nonverbal behavior   79%  86%  83%  .27  .79  2 7.59* 
CBCA + RM + nonverbal behavior 79%  91%  86%  .68  .60  4 16.00** 
10-11-year-olds 
CBCA               1 3.39  
RM               2 5.37 
Nonverbal behavior   43%  81%  61%  .12  .90  1 5.66* 
CBCA + RM + nonverbal behavior 64%  65%  65%  .19  .84  3 8.86* 
14-15-year-olds 
CBCA               1 1.67  
RM     69%  92%  82%  .68  .60  2 26.85** 
Nonverbal behavior             1 1.62 
CBCA + RM + nonverbal behavior 81%  93%  87%  .99  .50  5 34.76** 
undergraduates 
CBCA     65%  58%  62%  .15  .87  1 6.79**  
RM     73%  81%  77%  .51  .66  2 20.17** 
Nonverbal behavior   77%  65%  71%  .25  .80  2 10.87* 
CBCA + RM + nonverbal behavior 89%  88%  88%  1.09  .48  7 34.29** 
adult participants, replication Vrij et al. (2000) 
CBCA + RM + nonverbal behavior 81%  77%  79%  .64  .61  4 23.83** 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      1 CBCA represents the total CBCA score 
2 RM represents two variables: the total Reality Monitoring score and the cognitive operations variable 
 * p < .05,    ** p < .01 
 Deceptive responses           
 
 Authors' Notes 
 Aldert Vrij (PhD, 1991, Free University, Amsterdam) is a Professor of Applied Social Psychology, 
Lucy Akehurst (PhD, 1997, University of Portsmouth) is a Senior Lecturer, Stavroula Soukara (MSc, 1998) 
is a PhD student and Ray Bull (DSc, 1995, University of Portsmouth) is a Professor of Criminological and 
Legal Psychology. 
 This study was sponsored by a grant (R000222820) from the Economic and Social Research 
Council.  
 Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Aldert Vrij, University of Portsmouth, 
Psychology Department, King Henry Building, King Henry 1 Street, Portsmouth PO1 2DY, United 
Kingdom. Electronic mail may be sent via Internet to aldert.vrij@port.ac.uk  
1. See the Method section for a definition of the behaviors. 
2. See Vrij (2000) for detailed descriptions of the CBCA criteria. 
3. In these studies which involve adults as participants who talk about non-sexual events (including the 
present experiment) several CBCA criteria are typically not examined as they are probably specific for 
children who talk about sexual events. For example, criterion 10, "accurately reported details 
misunderstood", is fulfilled if someone speaks of details that are beyond the comprehension of the person, 
such as a child who describes the adult's sexual behavior but attributes it to a sneeze or pain. This criterion is 
typically ignored in experimental studies with adults as participants. 
4. It might seem suspicious from the participant's perspective that the experimenter would know that an 
interview was about to ensue in order to ascertain the truth of the blackboard mishap. We had prepared an 
answer which the experimenter would give in case a participant asked a question about this. However, none 
of the participants in this study raised this issue. In other words, we have no evidence to suggest that the 
participants were suspicious. 
5. In the procedure just described the liars were 'fabricating witnesses'. We also created a 'fabricating suspect 
condition'. In this condition the experimenter asked participants to wipe the blackboard clean while she 
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(experimenter) had to pop out for something. The experimenter then left the room, and all participants in 
this condition erased the information from the blackboard. Participants were asked to pretend that they 
(experimenter and participant) played Connect 4 and that someone else entered the room and wiped off the 
information, and so on. The suspect/witness manipulation was introduced for a purpose which goes beyond 
the scope of this article. Although this manipulation might be of theoretical interest for the present article as 
well (e.g., suspects might be more aroused than truth tellers and their responses might subsequently differ), 
the manipulation did not result in significant effects on the variables presented in the present article. Since 
we do not know why the effect was not significant (we cannot rule out that the manipulation was 
unsuccessful) this factor is ignored throughout this article. 
6. At this stage another manipulation took place which was, again, beyond the scope of this article. In order 
to facilitate the participants' preparation for the interview, they were 'lightly' or 'heavily' coached. 
Participants in the light coaching condition (N = 127) were told that it would be more likely that the 
interviewer would believe the participant if he/she told in lots of detail what happened when he/she was in 
the room. In addition to these light coaching instructions, participants in the heavy coaching condition (N = 
69) were taught some of the CBCA criteria. This coaching manipulation is irrelevant for the present article, 
and had only little effect on the findings presented in this article. This factor is therefore ignored throughout 
the article, but information will be given about the one occasion where this manipulation did have an effect 
on the findings. (See endnote 19 and see also Vrij, Akehurst, Soukara, & Bull, 2002). 
7. Again, the procedure described in the text was the procedure for the witness condition. After building 
rapport with the participant, the interviewer gave participants in the suspect condition the following 
instructions: "The reason I am interviewing you is that I have heard that YOU wiped some important 
information off the blackboard in the room you were just in. I understand that you were in there just now 
with (name of the experimenter). I need to know whether it was you or not!" For the remaining part, the 
suspect interviews and instructions were identical to the witness interviews and instructions. The interviewer 
knew the status (witness/suspect) of each participant when s/he arrived for his/her interview. 
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8. A study like this might raise ethical concerns. For example, we instructed participants, including children, 
to lie. We thought that this was acceptable for the following two reasons. First, the lie was not serious. 
Second, we know that telling lies is a regular event in life both for children (Ceci & DeSimone Leichtman, 
1992) and adults (DePaulo, Kashy, Kirkendol, Wyer, & Epstein, 1996). 
9. Differences between correlations in scale scoring and frequency scoring are probably caused by the fact 
that scale scoring is more subjective than frequency scoring, That is, using Likert scale scoring (the common 
procedure in CBCA research) involves two subjective processes: (1) indicating whether or not a criterion is 
present in a transcript, and (2) deciding to what extent a criterion is present (rarely present, strongly present, 
etc.). Frequency scoring only contains the first step, and is therefore, compared to Likert scale scoring, less 
subjective. Perhaps not surprisingly, the correlations in frequency scoring were generally higher than the 
correlations in Likert scale scoring. Analyses on the basis of frequency scoring are not reported in this 
article, as this type of scoring is not common practice in CBCA assessments. Also, analyses based upon 
scale scoring (presented in this article) were highly similar to findings which were obtained on the basis of 
frequency scoring. Therefore, presenting the frequency scoring results would not add any valuable 
information to this article. In other words, frequency scoring was solely conducted for inter-rater reliability 
purposes. 
10. RM scores cannot be averaged (like CBCA scores) as this is impossible with scores based on frequency 
scoring: It would give a variable with a high frequency of occurrence more weight than a variable with a 
low frequency of occurrence. 
11. Separate median splits were used for 5-6-year-olds and the remaining participants for the following 
reason: An ANOVA with Age Group as factor and visual details as dependent variable revealed a significant 
effect, F(3, 192) = 17.86, p < .01. Tukey HSD tests revealed that 5-6-year olds included significantly fewer 
details in their statements (M = 19.79, SD = 10.9) than any of the other three groups (10-11-year-olds: M = 
43.77, SD = 18.5; 14-15-year-olds: M = 39.63, SD = 12.78; undergraduates: M = 36.75, SD = 18.0). These 
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three groups did not differ significantly from each other. A median split for the whole group would therefore 
imply that almost all 5-6-year-olds would be allocated to the "low score" group and relatively many other 
participants to the "high score" group (as the median split would be relatively low). We therefore decided to 
use two different median splits, one for the 5-6-year olds (M = 18.00) and one for the other participants (M 
= 37.50). 
12. All truthful participants participated in more or less the same staged event. It might therefore be that the 
truths told by these participants bore certain similarities. These similarities could be picked up by the 
CBCA, Reality Monitoring and nonverbal raters after a few trials of coding, and this "knowledge" might 
have affected their codings. We do not think that this actually happened. Although there were similarities in 
the staged event, there were also differences which were purposefully introduced by us in order to prevent 
this happening. For example, different people were used to come into the room and wipe the blackboard. 
Also, the same person wore different clothes at different times. As a result, the descriptions of the "actor" 
differed considerably even in the truthful condition. (Because variations of the same staged event were 
introduced, we videotaped all participants while they were in the room with the experimenter, and checked 
the veracity of their stories afterwards by comparing their statements with what actually had happened. We 
did not come across any commissions, purposefully distorting the truth, in the truthful reports). Additionally, 
not all truthful participants gave a complete account, with some participants describing some features and 
other participants describing totally different features. 
13. All behaviors, except gaze aversion, were selected because we expected that liars had to think hard in 
the present study, and these behaviors are particularly associated with cognitive load (Burgoon et al., 1989; 
Ekman & Friesen, 1972; Goldman-Eisler, 1968; Vrij, 2000). Gaze aversion was selected because this is 
probably the most powerful subjective cue to deception, that is, when people are asked how they think liars 
behave, their most likely answer is that liars look away (Akehurst, Köhnken, Vrij, & Bull, 1996; Vrij & 
Semin, 1996). 
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14. Fewer limb movements were particularly caused by fewer hand and finger movements (F(3, 192) = 9.90, 
p < .01, eta2 = 13%: 5-6-year-olds: Mab = 24.53, SD = 26.6; 10-11-year-olds: Mc = 38.91, SD = 22.1; 14-15-
year-olds: Mbc = 33.01, SD = 27.1, undergraduates: Ma = 15.90, SD = 15.6) and fewer foot and leg 
movements (F(3, 192) = 7.85, p < .01, eta2 = 11%: 5-6-year-olds: Mc = 37.35, SD = 18.6; 10-11-year-olds: 
Mab = 24.16, SD = 21.5; 14-15-year-olds: Mbc = 29.38, SD = 32.5; undergraduates: Ma = 13.93, SD = 14.6). 
(Only mean scores with a different subscript differ significantly, p < .05, from each other). 
15. More speech disturbances were caused by more speech hesitations (F(3, 192) = 26.05, p <. 01, eta2 = 
.29: 5-6-year-olds: Ma = 3.68, SD = 4.0; 10-11-year-olds: Ma = 4.28, SD = 3.3; 14-15-year-olds: Ma = 3.51, 
SD = 3.3; undergraduates: Mb = 9.46, SD = 5.0). (Only mean scores with a different subscript differ 
significantly, p < .05, from each other). 
16. Although there was a decrease during deception of all types of limb movements (adaptors, illustrators, 
hand and finger movements and foot and leg movements), only the decrease in hand and finger movements 
was significant (liars: M = 24.93, SD = 22.7, truth tellers: M = 31.95, SD = 25.8, F(1, 188) = 6.97, p < .01, 
eta2 = .02). 
17. Auditory details, 5-6-year-olds: liars, M = .46, SD = .6, truth tellers, M = .62, SD = 1.1; 10-11-year-olds: 
liars, M = 2.29, SD = 2.2, truth tellers, M = 4.27, SD = 2.8; 14-15-year-olds: liars, M = 2.13, SD = 2.3, truth 
tellers, M = 4.79, SD = 3.3; undergraduates: liars, M = 3.08, SD = 2.5, truth tellers, M = 6.92, SD = 4.5.  
 Spatial details, 5-6-year-olds: liars, M = .68, SD = .5, truth tellers, M = .98, SD = 1.1; 10-11-year-
olds: liars, M = 1.88, SD = 1.8, truth tellers, M = 2.33, SD = 1.6; 14-15-year-olds: liars, M = 1.52, SD = .9, 
truth tellers, M = 2.12, SD = 1.4; undergraduates: liars, M = 2.62, SD = 2.3, truth tellers, M = 5.63, SD = 
5.7.  
 Temporal details, 5-6-year-olds: liars, M = .43, SD = .5, truth tellers, M = .83, SD = 1.0; 10-11-year-
olds: liars, M = 2.91, SD = 2.3, truth tellers, M = 3.42, SD = 2.7; 14-15-year-olds: liars, M = 2.37, SD = 1.6, 
truth tellers, M = 3.28, SD = 2.1; undergraduates: liars, M = 3.58, SD = 2.3, truth tellers, M = 6.63, SD = 
  




18. Analyses for each type of limb movement (adaptors, illustrators, hand and finger movements and foot 
and leg movements) per Age Group revealed that significant findings only emerged for hand and finger 
movements. Both 5-6-year-olds and college students showed fewer hand and finger movements when lying 
(5-6-year-olds: M(lie) = 12.42, SD = 11.7, M(truth) = 32.61, SD = 30.7, F(1, 33) = 5.45, p < .05, eta2 = ,14; 
college students: M(lie) = 10.55, SD = 8.5, M(truth) = 21.24, SD = 19.2, F(1, 50) = 6.77, p < .05, eta2 = .12). 
The difference in hand and finger movements was marginally significant for 14-15-year-olds, M(lie) = 
26.32, SD = 21.8, M(truth) = 39.01, SD = 30.1, F(1, 53) = 3.14, p = .08, eta2 = .06. 
19. For undergraduates, hit rates for CBCA scores were different for lightly or heavily coached participants 
(see endnote 6). When heavily coached participants were excluded from the analysis (69 participants were 
heavily coached), the total hit rate was 71% with 75% for lie detection and 67% for truth detection. 
20. Most, but not all, intercorrelations between the nine variables were low. Thirty out of 36 correlations were r's 
< .30, but three correlations were r's > .50. These were total CBCA - total RM score, r(196) = .60, total CBCA 
score - speech rate, r(196) = .70, and total RM score - speech rate, r(196) = .51. 
21. In the discriminant analysis of the present study, described before, total CBCA score, total RM score, 
cognitive operations, gaze aversion, movements, latency time, pauses, speech disturbances and speech rate 
were included. 
22. An alternative explanation for the lack of differences in RM scores between young liars and truth tellers 
is that both groups lack the ability to provide details. However, CBCA scores between truthful and deceptive 
statements did differ for young children which seems to contradict this explanation. 
23. Total sample: lie hit rate = 65%, truth hit rate = 64%, total hit rate = 64%, eigenvalue = .16, Lambda = 
.86, X2(2, N = 196) = 29.05, p < .01; 5-6-year-olds: lie hit rate = 71%, truth hit rate = 71%, total hit rate = 
71%, eigenvalue = .29, Lambda = .77, X2(2, N = 35) = 8.23, p < .05; 10-11-year-olds: lie hit rate = 68%, 
  




truth hit rate = 58%, total hit rate = 63%, eigenvalue = .14, Lambda = .88, X2(2, N = 54) = 6.67, p < .05; 14-
15-year-olds: lie hit rate = 65%, truth hit rate = 76%, total hit rate = 71%, eigenvalue = .42, Lambda = .70, 
X2(2, N = 55) = 18.31, p < .01; undergraduates: lie hit rate = 58%, truth hit rate = 73%, total hit rate = 65%, 
eigenvalue = .23, Lambda = .81, X2(2, N = 52) = 10.09, p < .01. 
